he cabinet was (M57)
taken (Feb. 12, 1883) to send troops to Suakin, Mr. Gladstone stood alone
in objecting. Many thousands of savages were slaughtered under
humanitarian pressure, not a few English lives were sacrificed, much
treasure flowed, and yet Sinkat fell, and Tokar fell, and our labours in
the eastern Soudan were practically fruitless.(85) The operations had no
effect upon the roll of the fierce mahdi wave over the Soudan.

In England, excitement of the unsound sort that is independent of
knowledge, consideration, or deliberation; independent of any weighing of
the actual facts and any forecast of latent possibilities, grew more and
more vociferous. Ministers quailed. Twice they inquired of their agent in
Egypt(86) whether General Gordon might not be of use, and twice they
received an adverse reply, mainly on the ground that the presence in
authority of a Christian officer was a dubious mode of confronting a
sweeping outbreak of moslem fanaticism, and would inevitably alienate
tribes that were still not caught by the Mahdi.(87) Unhappily a third
application from London at last prevailed, and Sir E. Baring, supported by
Nubar, by Sir Evelyn Wood, by Colonel Watson, who had served with Gordon
and knew him well, all agreed that Gordon would be the best man if he
would pledge himself to carry out the policy of withdrawing from the
Soudan as quickly as possible. "Whoever goes," said Sir E. Baring in
pregnant words to Lord Granville, will "undertake a service of great
difficulty and danger." This was on January 16th. Two days later the die
was cast. Mr. Gladstone was at Hawarden. Lord Granville submitted the
question (Jan. 14, 1884) to him in this form: "If Gordon says he believes
he could by his personal influence excite the tribes to escort the
Khartoum garrison and inhabitants to Suakin, a little pressure on Baring
might be advisable. The destruction of these poor people will be a great
disaster." Mr. Gladstone telegraphed that to this and other parts of the
same letter, he agreed. Granville then sent him a copy of the telegram
putting "a little pressure on Baring." To this Mr. Gladstone replied (Jan.
16) in words that, if they had only been taken to heart, would have made
all the difference:--

I can find no fault with your telegram to Baring _re_ Chinese
Gordon, and the main point that strikes me is this: While his
opinion on the Soudan may be of great value, must we not be very
careful in any