mation as to his position," and, "if necessary,
for rendering him assistance."(106) As soon as the decision was taken,
preparations were carried out with rapidity and skill. In the same month
Lord Wolseley was (M65) appointed to command the expedition, and on
September 9 he reached Cairo. The difficulties of a military decision had
been great, said Lord Hartington, and there was besides, he added, a
difference of opinion among the military authorities.(107) It was October
5 before Lord Wolseley reached Wady-Halfa, and the Nile campaign began.
Whatever decision military critics may ultimately form upon the choice of
the Nile route, or upon the question whether the enterprise would have
been any more successful if the route had been by Suakin or Korosko, it is
at least certain that no position, whether strategically false or no, has
ever evoked more splendid qualities in face of almost preterhuman
difficulties, hardship, and labour. The treacherous and unknown river, for
it was then unknown, with its rapids, its shifting sandbanks and tortuous
channels and rocky barriers and heart-breaking cataracts; the Bayuda
desert, haunted by fierce and stealthy enemies; the trying climate, the
heat, the thirst, all the wearisome embarrassments of transport on camels
emaciated by lack of food and water--such scenes exacted toil, patience,
and courage as worthy of remark and admiration as if the advance had
successfully achieved its object. Nobody lost heart. "Everything goes on
swimmingly," wrote Sir Herbert Stewart to Lord Wolseley, "_except as to
time_." This was on January 14, 1885. Five days later, he was mortally
wounded.
The end of it all, in spite of the gallantry of Abu Klea and Kirbekan, of
desert column and river column, is only too well known. Four of Gordon's
small steamers coming down from Khartoum met the British desert column at
Gubat on January 21. The general in command at once determined to proceed
to Khartoum, but delayed his start until the morning of the 24th. The
steamers needed repairs, and Sir Charles Wilson deemed it necessary for
the safety of his troops to make a reconnaissance down the river towards
Berber before starting up to Khartoum. He took with him on two of Gordon's
steamers--described as of the dimensions of the penny boats upon the
Thames, but bullet proof--a force of twenty-six British, and two hundred
and forty Soudanese. He had also in tow a nugger laden with dhura. This
was what, when Khartou
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