ay not have been a good
one; nobody else had a better.

It was not at all surprising that the cabinet should ask what new reason
had come to light why Zobeir should be trusted; why he should oppose the
Mahdi whom at first he was believed to have supported; why he should turn
the friend of Egypt; why he should be relied upon as the faithful ally of
England. To these and other doubts Gordon had excellent answers (March 8).
Zobeir would run straight, because it was his interest. If he would be
dangerous, was not the Mahdi dangerous, and whom save Zobeir could you set
up against the Mahdi? You talked of slave-holding and slave-hunting, but
would slave-holding and slave-hunting (M62) stop with your own policy of
evacuation? Slave-holding you cannot interfere with, and as for
slave-hunting, that depended on the equatorial provinces, where Zobeir
could be prevented from going, and besides he would have his hands full in
consolidating his power elsewhere. As for good faith towards Egypt,
Zobeir's stay in Cairo had taught him our power, and being a great trader,
he would rather seek Egypt's close alliance. Anyhow, said Gordon, "if you
do not send Zobeir, you have no chance of getting the garrisons away."

The matter was considered at two meetings of the cabinet, but the prime
minister was prevented by his physician from attending.(100) A difference
of opinion showed itself upon the despatch of Zobeir; viewed as an
abstract question, three of the Commons members inclined to favour it, but
on the practical question, the Commons members were unanimous that no
government from either side of the House could venture to sanction Zobeir.
Mr. Gladstone had become a strong convert to the plan of sending Zobeir.
"I am better in chest and generally," he wrote to Lord Granville, "but
unfortunately not in throat and voice, and Clark interdicts my appearance
at cabinet; but I am available for any necessary communication, say with
you, or you and Hartington." One of the ministers went to see him in his
bed, and they conversed for two hours. The minister, on his return,
reported with some ironic amusement that Mr. Gladstone considered it very
likely that they could not bring parliament to swallow Zobeir, but
believed that he himself could. Whether his confidence in this was right
or wrong, he was unable to turn his cabinet. The Queen telegraphed her
agreement with the prime minister. But this made no difference. "On
Saturday 15," Mr. Gladstone n