them, he is deluding himself: he is but
representing these activities in terms of Mind, and can never do otherwise.
Eventually he is obliged to admit that his ideas of Matter and Motion,
merely symbolic of unknowable realities, are complex states of
consciousness built out of units of feeling. But if, after admitting this,
he persists in asking whether units of feeling are of the same nature as
the units of force distinguished as external, or whether the units of force
distinguished as external are of the same nature as units of feeling; then
the reply, still substantially the same, is that we may go further towards
conceiving units of external force to be identical with units of feeling,
than we can towards conceiving units of feeling to be identical with units
of external force. Clearly, if units of external force are regarded as
absolutely unknown and unknowable, then to translate units of feeling into
them is to translate the known into the unknown, which is absurd. And if
they are what they are supposed to be by those who identify them with their
symbols, then the difficulty of translating units of feeling into them is
insurmountable: if Force as it objectively exists is absolutely alien in
nature from that which exists subjectively as Feeling, then the
transformation of Force into Feeling is unthinkable. Either way, therefore,
it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of outer existence.
But if, on the other hand, units of Force as they exist objectively are
essentially the same in nature with those manifested subjectively as units
of Feeling, then a conceivable hypothesis remains open. Every element of
that aggregate of activities constituting a consciousness is known as
belonging to consciousness only by its cohesion with the rest. Beyond the
limits of this coherent aggregate of activities exist activities quite
independent of it, and which cannot be brought into it. We may imagine,
then, that by their exclusion from the circumscribed activities
constituting consciousness, these outer activities, though of the same
intrinsic nature, become antithetically opposed in aspect. Being
disconnected from consciousness, or cut off by its limits, they are thereby
rendered foreign to it. Not being incorporated with its activities, or
linked with these as they are with one another, consciousness cannot, as it
were, run through them; and so they come to be figured as unconscious--are
symbolised as having the nature