best that I am able to supply. The conceptive faculty of the individual
having been determined by the experience of the race, that which is
inconceivable by the intelligence of the race may be said to be
inconceivable to the intelligence of the individual in an _absolute_ sense;
no effort on his part can enable him to surmount the organically imposed
conditions of his conceptive faculty. But that which is inconceivable
merely to one individual or generation, while it is not inconceivable to
the intelligence of the race, may properly be said to be inconceivable to
the intelligence of that individual or generation only in a _relative_
sense; apart from the special condition to which the individual
intelligence has been subjected, there is nothing in the conditions of
human intelligence as such to prevent the thing from being conceived.
[While this work has been passing through the press, I have found that Mr.
G. H. Lewes has already employed the above terms in precisely the same
sense as that which is above explained.--1878.]

[34] I should here like to have added some considerations on Sir W.
Hamilton's remarks concerning the effect of training upon the mind in this
connection; but, to avoid being tedious, I shall condense what I have to
say into a few sentences. What Hamilton maintains is very true, viz., that
the study of classics, moral and mental philosophy, &c., renders the mind
more capable of believing in a God than does the study of physical science.
The question, however, is, Which class of studies ought to be considered
the more authoritative in this matter? I certainly cannot see what title
classics, history, political economy, &c., have to be regarded at all; and
although the mental and moral sciences have doubtless a better claim, still
I think they must be largely subordinate to those sciences which deal with
the whole domain of nature besides. Further, I should say that there is no
very strong _affirmative_ influence created on the mind in this respect by
any class of studies; and that the only reason why we so generally find
Theism and classics, &c., united, is because we so seldom find classics,
&c., and physical science united; the _negative_ influence of the latter,
in the case of classical minds, being therefore generally absent.

[35] The qualities named are only known in a relative sense, and therefore
the apparent contradiction may be destitute of meaning in an absolute
sense.

[36] All the quotat