e evidence of causation on the side of
Materialism. As this is an important subject, I will be a little more
explicit. We are agreed that Force and Matter are entities external to
consciousness, of which we can possess only symbolical knowledge.
Therefore, as we have said, Force and Matter may be anything within the
whole range of the possible. But we know that Mind is a possible entity,
while we have no certain knowledge of any other possible entity. Hence we
are justified in saying, It is possible that Force and Matter may be
identical with the only entity which we know as certainly possible; but
forasmuch as we do not know the sum of possible entities, we have no means
of calculating the chances there are that what we know as Force and Matter
are identical in nature with Mind. Still, that there is _a_ chance we
cannot dispute; all we can assert is, that we are unable to determine its
value, and that it would be a mistake to suppose we can do so, even in the
lowest degree, by Mr. Spencer's test of inconceivability. Nevertheless, the
fact that there is such a chance renders it in some indeterminate degree
more probable that what we know as Force and Matter are identical with what
we know as Mind, than that what we know as oxygen and hydrogen are
identical with what we know as water. So that to this extent the essential
doctrine of Materialism is "ruled out" in a further degree by the
philosophy of the Unknowable than is the chemical doctrine of equivalents.
But, of course, this indefinite possibility of what we know as Force and
Matter being identical with what we know as Mind does not neutralise, in
any determinable degree, the considerations whereby Materialism in its
present shape infers that what we know as Force and Matter are probably
distinct from what we know as Mind.

But I see no reason why Materialism should be restricted to this "its
present shape." Even if we admit to the fullest extent the validity of Mr.
Spencer's argument, and conclude with Professor Clifford as a matter of
probability that "the universe consists entirely of Mind-stuff," I do not
see that the admission would affect Materialism in any essential respect.
For here again the admission would amount to little else, so far as
Materialism is directly concerned, than a change of terminology: instead of
calling objective existence "Matter," we call it "Mind-stuff." I say "to
_little_ else," because no doubt in one particular there is here some
cha