icularly if we bear in mind that the general outcome of their united
action as we observe it--the cosmic harmony on which so much stress is
laid--is not _perfectly_ harmonious. Cataclysms--whether it be the capture
of an insect, or the ruin of a star--although events of comparatively rare
occurrence if at any given time we take into account the total number of
insects or the total number of stars, are events which nevertheless do
occasionally happen. And the fact that even cataclysms take place in
accordance with so-called natural law, serves but to emphasise the
consideration on which we are engaged--viz., that the total result of the
combined action of general laws is not such as to produce perfect order.
Lastly, if the answer is made that human ideas of perfect order may not
correspond with the highest ideal of such order, I observe that to make
such a answer is merely to abandon the subject of discussion; for if a
theist rests his argument on the basis of our human conception of order, he
is not free to maintain his argument and at the same time to abandon its
basis at whatever point the latter may be shown untenable.

[30] Since the above was written, the first volume of Mr. Spencer's
"Sociology" has been published; and those who may not as yet have read the
first half of that work are here strongly recommended to do so; for Mr.
Spencer has there shown, in a more connected and conclusive manner than has
ever been shown before, how strictly natural is the growth of all
superstitions and religions--_i.e._, of all the theories of personal agency
in nature.--1878.

[31] Herbert Spencer's Essays, vol. iii. pp. 246-249 (1874).

[32] This is the truly inconceivable element in the physical theory. As I
have shown in the pleading on the side of Atheism, the supposed
inconceivability of cosmic harmony being due to mindless forces, is not of
such a kind as wholly refuses to be surmounted by symbolic conceptions of a
sufficiently abstract character. But it is impossible, by the aid of any
symbols, to gain a conception of an eternal existence. And I may here point
out, that if Mind is said to be the cause of evolution, not only does the
statement involve the inconceivable proposition that such a Mind must be
infinite in respect to its powers of supervision, direction, &c.; but the
statement also involves a necessary alternative between two additional
inconceivable propositions--viz., either that such a Mind must have been
eter