st on the single known result of telluric evolution,
so long as an infinite number of the results of evolution elsewhere remain
unknown.

And now, lastly, it must be observed that even in the one case with which
we are acquainted, the net product of evolution is not such as can of
itself point us to _beneficent_ design. Professor Flint, indeed, in common
with theologians generally, argues that it does. I will therefore briefly
criticise his remarks on this subject, believing, as I do, that they form a
very admirable illustration of what I conceive to be a general
principle--viz., that minds which already believe in the existence of a
Deity are, as a rule, not in a position to view this question of
beneficence in nature in a perfectly impartial manner. For if the existence
of a Deity is presupposed, a mind with any particle of that most noble
quality--reverence--will naturally hesitate to draw conclusions that
partake of the nature of blasphemy; and therefore, unconsciously perhaps to
themselves, they endeavour in various ways to evade the evidence which, if
honestly and impartially considered, can scarcely fail to negative the
argument from beneficence in the universe.

Professor Flint argues that the "law of over-production," and the
consequent struggle for existence, being "the reason why the world is so
wonderfully rich in the most varied forms of life," is "a means to an end
worthy of Divine Wisdom." "Although involving privation, pain, and
conflict, its final result is order and beauty. All the perfections of
sentient creatures are represented as due to it. Through it the lion has
gained its strength, the deer its speed, and the dog its sagacity. The
inference seems natural that these perfections were designed to be attained
by it; that this state of struggle was ordained for the sake of the
advantages which it is actually seen to produce. The suffering which the
conflict involves may indicate that God has made even animals for some
higher end than happiness--that he cares for animal perfection as well as
for animal enjoyment; but it affords no reason for denying that the ends
which the conflict actually serves it was intended to serve."

Now, whatever may be thought of such an argument as an attempted
justification of beneficent design already on independent ground believed
to exist, it is manifestly no argument at all as establishing any
presumption in favour of such design, unless it could be shown that the
De