d the
General Council had exercised the right to advise the crown in
legislative matters, and their successors in Parliament continued to
do the same, but the commoners who in the thirteenth century were (p. 015)
brought in were present, in theory, for fiscal rather than legislative
purposes. The distinction, however, was difficult to maintain, and
with the continued growth of the parliamentary body the legislative
character was recognized eventually to be inherent in the whole of it.
At the opening of the fourteenth century laws were made, technically,
_by_ the king with the _assent_ of the magnates at the _request_ of
the commoners. The knights and burgesses were recognized as
petitioners for laws, rather than as legislators. They could ask for
the enactment of a statute, or for a clearer definition of law, but it
was for the king and his councillors to determine finally whether
legislation was required and what form it should assume. Even when a
law which was requested was promised it not infrequently happened that
the intent of the Commons was thwarted, for the text of the measure
was not drawn up, normally, until after the parliament was dissolved,
both form and content were determined arbitrarily by the crown and
council, and between petition and statute there might be, and often
was, gross discrepancy.
*15. Development of the Legislative Process.*--By a memorable statute of
1322, in the reign of Edward II., it was stipulated that "the matters
which are to be established for the estate of our lord the king and of
his heirs, and for the estate of the realm and of the people, shall be
treated, accorded, and established in parliaments, by our lord the king,
and by the assent of the prelates, earls, and barons, and the
commonalty of the realm; according as it hath been before accustomed."[13]
This declaration is understood to have established, not only the
essentially legislative character of Parliament, but the legislative
parity of the commoners with the magnates. It remained, however, to
substitute for the right of petition the right of legislating by bill.
Throughout the fourteenth century Parliament, and especially the
Commons, pressed for an explicit recognition of the principle that the
statute in its final form should be identical with the petition upon
which it was based. In 1414 Henry V. granted that "from henceforth
nothing be enacted to the petitions of his commons that be contrary to
their asking, wher
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