pulse of her forward sails, turned sharp
round to the right, and ran perpendicularly into the _Nymphe_. The
British boarded her, fixed in this disadvantageous position, fought
their way aft, and, although the French crew was numerically superior,
in ten minutes hauled down the colors. In this brief hour they had lost
twenty-three killed and twenty-seven wounded, the enemy sixty-three
killed and wounded, out of ships' companies numbering respectively two
hundred and forty and three hundred and twenty.

This was the first decisive frigate action of the War of the French
Revolution, and in consequence great was the enthusiasm aroused. Lord
Howe wrote to Pellew, "The manner in which you have taken the enemy's
ship will set an example for the war." In truth, however, while
admitting the soundness of Pellew's judgment in adopting the course he
did, the actual demand upon his personal skill was less, and in so far
the credit due therefore less, than in the second successful frigate
action, in the following October, in which Sir James Saumarez commanded.
Not only was the French vessel's superiority in force more marked in the
latter instance, but Saumarez's ship there met with an accident similar
in character to that which befell the _Cleopatre_, from the consequences
of which she was extricated by his masterly seamanship. Still, it may
with fairness be argued that, as the one action from its attendant
circumstances evidenced the individual skill of the commander, so the
other testified to the antecedent preparation and efficiency of the
crew, which are always to be attributed to the care of the captain,
especially under the conditions of Pellew's enlistments. Both captains
fully deserved the reward of knighthood bestowed upon their success.
Israel Pellew was promoted to post-captain.

During the first three years of this war British commerce in the
neighborhood of the Channel suffered most severely from French cruisers.
The latter resumed the methods of Jean Bart and other celebrated
privateers of the days of Louis XIV.; the essence of which was to prey
upon the enemy's commerce, not by single vessels, but by small squadrons
of from five to seven. Cruisers so combined, acting in mutual support,
were far more efficient than the same number acting separately.
Spreading like a fan, they commanded a wider expanse than a ship alone;
if danger arose, they concentrated for mutual support; did opportunity
offer, the work was cut out