ief, that the town faces easterly,
rising abruptly up a steep hill; that from its front there then
projected a pier, nearly a thousand feet long, at whose end was a
circular fort, carrying seventy guns in three tiers; from that point a
mole extended at right angles to the southward,--parallel, that is, in a
general sense, to the town front, but curving inward through the
southern half of its length, so as better to embrace and shelter the
vessels inside. This mole was somewhat over a thousand feet in length,
and had throughout two tiers of guns, linked at their northern extremity
to the circular fort at the pier end. These principal works were flanked
and covered, at either end and on the hillside, by others which it is
unnecessary to particularize. The total number of guns bearing seaward
numbered near three hundred, of very respectable size for that day. The
basin formed by the pier and the mole constituted the port proper, and
in it, at the time of the attack, was collected the entire Algerine
navy, nine frigates and corvettes and thirty-seven gunboats, the paltry
force that had so long terrorized the Mediterranean.

In prevision of his present enterprise, Lord Exmouth before leaving the
Mediterranean had despatched a light cruiser to Algiers, on a casual
visit similar to those continually made by ships of war to foreign
ports. Her commander, Captain Charles Warde, received from him very
precise and most secret instructions to examine closely into the
defences and soundings; to do which it was necessary not only to observe
every precaution of seeming indifference,--even to the extent of
appearing engrossed with social duties,--but also to conduct under this
cover measurements and observations of at least approximate correctness.
This duty was performed with singular diligence and success, with the
double result of revealing the hopeless inaccuracy of existing charts
and of placing in Exmouth's hands a working plan of the ground,
perfectly trustworthy for his tactical dispositions.

As before remarked, in the sketch of Lord St. Vincent, the defence and
attack of seaports, involving as they do both occupation of permanent
positions and the action of mobile bodies, are tactical questions. They
differ much, though not radically, from operations in the open sea, or
in the field, where positions may be taken incidentally, but where the
movements of mobile bodies are the principal factor. In this way, though
without using