ly I have ever seen.... Although the naval command in
Quiberon may appear too important for a captain, I shall not divest him
of it, unless I am ordered to do so; feeling a thorough conviction that
no man in His Majesty's Navy, be his rank ever so high, will fill it so
well." At the time this was written, June, 1800, he had seven
ships-of-the-line under his orders. After the Peace of Amiens, when war
again began in 1803, he commanded a similar division watching the
Spanish port of Ferrol, in which, although formally neutral, a French
division lay at anchor; and in discharge of this duty, both as a seaman
and an administrator, he again justified the eulogium of the old Earl,
now at the head of the navy as First Lord.

In 1804 he was promoted Rear-Admiral, and soon afterwards assigned to
the East India Station, which he held from 1805 to 1809. Here no naval
actions on the great scale were to be fought, but under his systematic
organization of convoys and cruisers for the protection of commerce the
insurance premium--the war risk--on the most exposed routes fell
markedly,--for the port of Bombay fifty per cent less than at any former
period of hostilities; while the losses by capture, when the merchants
observed his instructions, amounted to but one per cent on the property
insured, which was less than those caused by the dangers of the sea, and
considerably less, also, than the average war losses in other parts of
the world. All this shows great ability, carefully utilized in diligent
preparation and efficient precaution; and the same characteristics are
to be observed in his administration of the Mediterranean command, of
wider scope and more purely military importance. Nevertheless, it gives
no sure proof of the particular genius of a great captain. Whether,
having forged his weapon, Pellew could also wield it; whether, having
carefully sowed, he could also reap the harvest by large combinations on
the battle-field, must remain uncertain, at least until probable
demonstration of his conceptions is drawn from his papers. Nothing is as
yet adduced to warrant positive inference.

Pellew's Mediterranean command coincided in time with the period of
Napoleon's falling fortunes. After Trafalgar, the Emperor decided to
increase his navy largely, but to keep it in port instead of at sea,
forcing Great Britain also to maintain huge fleets, the expense of
which, concurring with the commercial embarrassments that he sought to
brin