le line. Their ideal appears to have been that of the tournament,
where every advantage of numbers and combination was rejected in order
to insure that the test should be that of individual courage and skill.
So strong was this tradition in the British navy that its ablest
contemporary chronicler, James, has sought to explain away, half
apologetically, the advantage gained by Nelson in doubling on the French
van at the Nile.

The Dutch, equally quixotic, refrained from taking advantage of the
enemy's inability to use his broadsides while thus approaching nearly
head-on. Arrayed in a close column, the ships about six hundred feet
apart, the crews at the guns, and the marines drawn up on the poops,
they waited in silence until the English, at 8 A.M., were in position at
half musket shot. Then the battle-flag was hoisted by each admiral, and
all opened together, the conflict raging with fury for nearly four
hours. It was the first time since the days of the great De Ruyter, more
than a century before, that these kindred people had thus met in fair
fight upon the sea. Equal in courage and in seamanship, and each
neglecting to seek a tactical advantage, the usual result followed. Many
men were killed and wounded, no ship was taken, and the combatants
separated after a drawn battle; but as one Dutch ship sank the next day,
and their convoy could not proceed, the British claimed a victory. Their
own merchant vessels, being on the return voyage, were able to complete
it.

Saumarez had shown his usual gallantry, and was again promoted. On the
23d of August, eighteen days after the action, he was made commander
into the _Tisiphone_, a small but fast cruiser, technically called a
fire-ship, and attached to the Channel fleet. In December, the British
government learned that a large number of transports and supply ships
were about to sail from Brest for the West Indies. These were to carry
troops and stores to the fleet of Count De Grasse, who had returned to
Martinique after the surrender at Yorktown, and was now about to
undertake the conquest of Jamaica. It was imperative to intercept an
expedition so essential to the success of the French plan, and Admiral
Kempenfelt--the same who afterwards, in the _Royal George_, "went down
with twice four hundred men"--was sent in pursuit with twelve
ships-of-the-line. The _Tisiphone_ accompanied them as lookout vessel,
and on the 12th of December, 1781, being then well ahead of the fleet,