of 1801, shattered by Nelson at
Copenhagen; and for this purpose he intended to occupy both Portugal and
the kingdom of Naples. A powerful British expedition against Egypt had
entered the Mediterranean. It was essential either to attack this
directly, or to cripple its communications. Unable to do the former,
and persistently thwarted in his attempts to reinforce his own troops in
that distant dependency by the close watch of the British navy, of which
Saumarez gave so conspicuous an illustration before Brest, Napoleon
resorted to the common and sound military expedient of collecting a
threatening force upon the flank of his enemy's line of communications.
He directed a concentration of the Spanish and French navies at Cadiz,
which, by its nearness to the straits, met the desired requirement.
Among others, three French ships were ordered thither from Toulon.

The British ministry was informed that at Cadiz were collecting Spanish
vessels, said by report to be intended against Portugal. This is
unlikely, as Bonaparte could have subdued that country from the land
side by the assistance of Spain; moreover, the object of the
concentration is stated in his letters. A squadron of five
ships-of-the-line was accordingly formed, and placed under the command
of Saumarez, who on the 1st of January, 1801, had been made a rear
admiral. His orders were to go off Cadiz, where he would find two more
vessels, and to prevent the enemies within the port from sailing, or
from being joined by any from outside. Whatever Bonaparte's object, it
would be thwarted by a force thus interposed, in a position to meet
either one or the other of the converging detachments before they could
unite.

Saumarez sailed on his mission June 16, 1801, and on the 28th arrived
off Cadiz. On the 5th of July he was informed that three French ships
had anchored off Algeciras, the Spanish port on the west side of
Gibraltar Bay, confronting the British fortress on the east side. This
was the division from Toulon, which upon reaching the straits first
learned of the British squadron that effectually prevented its entrance
to Cadiz.

Saumarez at once started for Algeciras with six of his
ships-of-the-line, the seventh being out of recall to the northward. The
following day, July 6th, he entered the bay, and found the French moored
in a strong position, under cover of Spanish land batteries, and
supported by a number of gunboats. Still, though difficult and doubtful,