her of the two occasions when he succeeded in
striking their column from to leeward, any intention, such as Howe on
the 29th communicated by signal and enforced by action, of breaking
through the enemy's line even at the cost of breaking his own. Not even
on April 12th had Rodney, as far as appears, any such formulated plan.
There is here, therefore, distinct progress, in the nature of reflective
and reasoned development; for it is scarcely to be supposed that Howe's
assiduity and close contact with the navy had failed to note, for future
application, the incidents of Rodney's battles, which had been the
subject of animated discussion and censure by eye-witnesses.

It will be recognized that the conception in Howe's mind, maintained
unchangeably and carried consistently into effect during these two days,
was to attack continually, as opportunity offered, the rear end of the
enemy's column, which corresponds precisely with the attack upon the
flank of a line of battle on shore. Merit does not depend upon result,
but fortunate result should be noted for the encouragement and guidance
of the future. In consequence of these sustained and judiciously
directed movements, and of the steps found necessary by the French
admiral because of injuries received, the enemy had lost from their line
four ships, of which one was of one hundred and twenty guns, another of
eighty; while of those retained one had lost all her spars save the
lower masts, and had thenceforth to be towed in action. Against this was
to be set only one British seventy-four, disabled on the 28th and
returned to port; their other damaged vessels refitted at sea and stayed
with the fleet. On the other hand, Howe's separated division of six
remained separated, whereas four fresh French ships joined their main
fleet on the 30th. Admirable tactics were thus neutralized by defective
strategy; and therefore it may with substantial accuracy be said that
Howe's professional qualities and defects were both signally illustrated
in this, his last conspicuous service.

The French admiral on the evening of the 29th saw that he now must
fight, and at a disadvantage; consequently, he could not hope to protect
the convoy. As to save this was his prime object, the next best thing
was to entice the British out of its path. With this view he stood away
to the northwest; while a dense fog coming on both favored his design
and prevented further encounter during the two ensuing days, t