anner, and through the existing local
authorities.

In great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable, at least for a
time, to provide for the immense forces placed on foot, by any regular
system of magazines or of ordinary requisitions: in such cases their
subsistence is entirely intrusted to the troops themselves, who levy
contributions wherever they pass. The inevitable consequences of this
system are universal pillage and a total relaxation of discipline; the
loss of private property and the violation of individual rights, are
followed by the massacre of all straggling parties, and the ordinary
peaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and
implacable enemies.

In this connection the war in the Spanish peninsula is well worthy of
study. At the beginning of this war Napoleon had to choose between
methodical operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army,
or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for; and irregular
warfare, with forced requisitions--war being made to support war. The
question was thoroughly discussed.

On the one hand, by sacrificing three or four millions of francs from
the French treasury, he would have been able to support his troops
without requisitions, would have maintained good order and discipline in
his armies, and by the distribution of this money among a people poor
and interested, he would have made many partisans. He could then have
offered them, with a firm and just hand, the olive or the sword. But
then the drafts upon the French treasury, had the war been a protracted
one, would have been enormous for the support of an army of 200,000 men
in Spain. Moreover, the hostile and insurrectionary state of the local
authorities rendered regular and legal requisitions almost impossible;
and the want of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable transport,
rendered problematical the possibility of moving a sufficient quantity
of stores in an insurrectionary country. Besides, no great detachments
could have been made to regulate the administration of the provinces, or
to pursue the insurgent corps into the fastnesses of the mountains. In
fine, by this system, he would have effected a military occupation of
Spain without its subjugation.

On the other hand, by marching rapidly against all organized masses,
living from day to day upon the local resources of the country, as he
had done in Italy, sparing his reserves for the occupation and
pacif