ss may frustrate our plans of a siege or of an
important military operation. If the Prussian army, when besieging
Olmutz, had observed this rule, the capture of a convoy would not have
forced them to raise the siege and to retreat.

Napoleon estimates that an army of 100,000 men in position will require
the daily arrival of from four to five hundred wagon loads of
provisions.

The difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c., in a retreat, is
always very great, and the very best generals have frequently failed on
this point. Indeed, the best concerted measures will sometimes fail,
amid the confusion and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an able
and active enemy in pursuit. In such a case, the loss of the
provision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead to the most
terrible disasters. We will allude to two examples of this kind: the
retreat of the English from Spain in 1809, and that of the French from
Russia in 1812.

When Sir John Moore saw that a retreat had become necessary to save his
army from entire destruction, he directed all the baggage and stores to
be taken to the rear, and every possible arrangement to be made for
their preservation and for the regular supplies of the army. But the
want of discipline in his troops, and more especially the want of a
proper engineer organization to prepare the requisite means for
facilitating his own marches, and impeding the enemy's pursuit,
prevented his plans from being fully carried into execution. Much
suffering and great losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops;
a large portion of his baggage and military stores was captured, and
even the treasure of his army, amounting to some 200,000 dollars, was
abandoned through the ignorance and carelessness of the escorting
officer.

In Napoleon's march into Russia, his plans had been so admirably
combined, that from Mentz to Moscow not a single estafette or convoy, it
is said, was carried off in this campaign; nor was there a day passed
without his receiving intelligence from France. When the retreat was
begun, (after the burning of Moscow,) he had six lines of magazines in
his rear; the 1st, at Smolensk, ten days' march from Moscow; those of
the 2d line at Minsk and Wilna, eight marches from Smolensk; those of
the 3d line at Kowno, Grodno, and Bialystok; those of the 4th line at
Elbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and Warsaw; those of the 5th
line at Dantzic, Bamberg, and Posen; those of