of Entente troops to Serbia in the spring of
1915, and that the question was discussed between the British and
French Governments; but I know nothing of this, only having come to be
behind the scenes of the Near Eastern drama at a somewhat later date.

Objections to such a course undoubtedly existed, even leaving out of
account the fact that our Government was, with the approval of that of
Paris, committing itself at the time more and more definitely to the
Hellespont-Bosphorus-Black Sea project. In the first place, Salonika
happened to be in the hands of neutral Greece, although that
difficulty would probably have been got over readily enough then. In
the second place, the despatch of a Franco-British force to Serbia in
the spring would have been playing the enemy's game to the extent of
virtually tying up that force and of condemning it to inactivity for
the time being, so as to provide against a danger--hostile attack on
Serbia--which might never materialize, and which actually did not
materialize until the autumn. In the third place, there was always,
with amateur strategists about, the grave risk that a measure taken
with the object of safeguarding Serbia as far as possible, might
translate itself into a great offensive operation against the Central
Powers from the south, absorbing huge Anglo-French forces, conducted
under great difficulties in respect to communications with the sea,
and playing into the hands of the German Great General Staff by
enabling that wide-awake body to make the very fullest use of its
strategical assets in respect to "interior lines." Finally, we could
not depend upon Bulgaria siding with the Entente, nor even Roumania;
and although Italy would certainly not take up arms against us she had
not yet declared herself an Ally.

The above reference to Bulgaria introduces a question which added
greatly to the perplexities of the Near Eastern problem then and
afterwards, perplexities that were aggravated by the well-founded
suspicion with which Bulgaria's monarch was on all hands regarded. The
Bulgars coveted Macedonia. But the greater part of Macedonia happened
as a result of the Balkan upheavals of 1912 and 1913 to belong to
Serbia, and the rest of it belonged to Greece. Into the ethnographical
aspect of the Macedonian problem it is not necessary to enter here.
The cardinal fact remained that Bulgaria wanted, and practically
demanded, this region. While we might have been ready enough to give