rd in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness? Thought,
therefore, and extension are qualities wholly incompatible, and never
can incorporate together into one subject.

This argument affects not the question concerning the substance of the
soul, but only that concerning its local conjunction with matter; and
therefore it may not be improper to consider in general what objects
are, or are not susceptible of a local conjunction. This is a curious
question, and may lead us to some discoveries of considerable moment.

The first notion of space and extension is derived solely from the
senses of sight and feeling; nor is there any thing, but what is
coloured or tangible, that has parts disposed after such a manner, as to
convey that idea. When we diminish or encrease a relish, it is not after
the same manner that we diminish or encrease any visible object; and
when several sounds strike our hearing at once, custom and reflection
alone make us form an idea of the degrees of the distance and contiguity
of those bodies, from which they are derived. Whatever marks the place
of its existence either must be extended, or must be a mathematical
point, without parts or composition. What is extended must have a
particular figure, as square, round, triangular; none of which will
agree to a desire, or indeed to any impression or idea, except to these
two senses above-mentioned. Neither ought a desire, though indivisible,
to be considered as a mathematical point. For in that case it would be
possible, by the addition of others, to make two, three, four desires,
and these disposed and situated in such a manner, as to have a
determinate length, breadth and thickness; which is evidently absurd.

It will not be surprising after this, if I deliver a maxim, which is
condemned by several metaphysicians, and is esteemed contrary to the
most certain principles of hum reason. This maxim is that an object
may exist, and yet be no where: and I assert, that this is not only
possible, but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after
this manner. An object may be said to be no where, when its parts are
not so situated with respect to each other, as to form any figure or
quantity; nor the whole with respect to other bodies so as to answer to
our notions of contiguity or distance. Now this is evidently the case
with all our perceptions and objects, except those of the sight and
feeling. A moral reflection cannot be placed on the