must necessarily be answered, if we would have the idea of self pass for
clear and intelligible, It must be some one impression, that gives rise
to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but
that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have
a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that
impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course
of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But
there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief
and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all
exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these
impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and
consequently there is no such idea.

But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon
this hypothesis? All these are different, and distinguishable, and
separable from each other, and may be separately considered, and may
exist separately, and have no Deed of tiny thing to support their
existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how
are they connected with it? For my part, when I enter most intimately
into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception
or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or
pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and
never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions
are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of
myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions
removed by death, and coued I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor
love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely
annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a
perfect non-entity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection
thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I call
reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in
the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this
particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,
which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle
in me.

But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to
affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or
collection of different perceptions, which s