ties of a perception. Now the
most obvious of all its qualities is extension. The perception consists
of parts. These parts are so situated, as to afford us the notion
of distance and contiguity; of length, breadth, and thickness. The
termination of these three dimensions is what we call figure. This
figure is moveable, separable, and divisible. Mobility, and separability
are the distinguishing properties of extended objects. And to cut short
all disputes, the very idea of extension is copyed from nothing but an
impression, and consequently must perfectly agree to it. To say the idea
of extension agrees to any thing, is to say it is extended.

The free-thinker may now triumph in his turn; and having found there are
impressions and ideas really extended, may ask his antagonists, how
they can incorporate a simple and indivisible subject with an extended
perception? All the arguments of Theologians may here be retorted upon
them. Is the indivisible subject, or immaterial substance, if you
will, on the left or on the right hand of the perception? Is it in this
particular part, or in that other? Is it in every part without being
extended? Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest? It
is impossible to give any answer to these questions, but what will both
be absurd in itself, and will account for the union of our indivisible
perceptions with an extended substance.

This gives me an occasion to take a-new into consideration the question
concerning the substance of the soul; and though I have condemned that
question as utterly unintelligible, yet I cannot forbear proposing some
farther reflections concerning it. I assert, that the doctrine of the
immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance
is a true atheism, and will serve to justify all those sentiments, for
which Spinoza is so universally infamous. From this topic, I hope at
least to reap one advantage, that my adversaries will not have any
pretext to render the present doctrine odious by their declamations,
when they see that they can be so easily retorted on them.

The fundamental principle of the atheism of Spinoza is the doctrine
of the simplicity of the universe, and the unity of that substance, in
which he supposes both thought and matter to inhere. There is only one
substance, says he, in the world; and that substance is perfectly simple
and indivisible, and exists every where, without any local presence.
Whatever we discove