FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   231   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239   240   241   242   243   244   245   246   247   248   249   250   251   252   253   254   255  
256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265   266   267   268   269   270   271   272   273   274   275   276   277   278   279   280   >>   >|  
11th of March 1719, and the 3rd of August 1733? Or will he affirm, because he has entirely forgot the incidents of these days, that the present self is not the same person with the self of that time; and by that means overturn all the most established notions of personal identity? In this view, therefore, memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by shewing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. It will be incumbent on those, who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal identity, to give a reason why we cm thus extend our identity beyond our memory. The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion, which is of great importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice and subtile questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as gramatical than as philosophical difficulties. Identity depends on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion. But as the relations, and the easiness of the transition may diminish by insensible degrees, we have no just standard, by which we can decide any dispute concerning the time, when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except so fax as the relation of parts gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union, as we have already observed. What I have said concerning the first origin and uncertainty of our notion of identity, as applied to the human mind, may be extended with little or no variation to that of simplicity. An object, whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the same manner as one perfectly simple and indivisible and requires not a much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. From this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity to it, and feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity, and the center of all the different parts and qualities of the object. Thus we have finished our examination of the several systems of philosophy, both of the intellectual and natural world; and in our miscellaneous way of reasoning have been led into several topics; which will either illustrate and confirm some preceding part of this discourse, or prepare the way for our following opinions. It
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   231   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239   240   241   242   243   244   245   246   247   248   249   250   251   252   253   254   255  
256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265   266   267   268   269   270   271   272   273   274   275   276   277   278   279   280   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

identity

 

personal

 

memory

 
relations
 

relation

 
simplicity
 

principle

 

transition

 

object

 
affirm

produce

 

present

 

existent

 

imagination

 

operates

 

variation

 

imaginary

 
applied
 
origin
 
uncertainty

notion

 

fiction

 
extended
 

observed

 

operation

 

natural

 

miscellaneous

 
intellectual
 

examination

 

systems


philosophy

 

opinions

 

reasoning

 

preceding

 

discourse

 

prepare

 

confirm

 
illustrate
 

topics

 
finished

stretch

 

thought

 

greater

 

requires

 

perfectly

 

simple

 

indivisible

 

conception

 

support

 

center