he same to the
feeling, nor is there much more effort of thought required in the latter
case than in the former. The relation facilitates the transition of the
mind from one object to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if
it contemplated one continued object. This resemblance is the cause
of the confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of
identity, instead of that of related objects. However at one instant we
may consider the related succession as variable or interrupted, we are
sure the next to ascribe to it a perfect identity, and regard it as
enviable and uninterrupted. Our propensity to this mistake is so great
from the resemblance above-mentioned, that we fall into it before we are
aware; and though we incessantly correct ourselves by reflection, and
return to a more accurate method of thinking, yet we cannot long sustain
our philosophy, or take off this biass from the imagination. Our last
resource is to yield to it, and boldly assert that these different
related objects are in effect the same, however interrupted and
variable. In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we often
feign some new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects
together, and prevents their interruption or variation. Thus we feign
the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove
the interruption: and run into the notion of a soul, and self, and
substance, to disguise the variation. But we may farther observe, that
where we do not give rise to such a fiction, our propension to confound
identity with relation is so great, that we are apt to imagine [Footnote
10] something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, beside their
relation; and this I take to be the case with regard to the identity
we ascribe to plants and vegetables. And even when this does not take
place, we still feel a propensity to confound these ideas, though we
a-re not able fully to satisfy ourselves in that particular, nor
find any thing invariable and uninterrupted to justify our notion of
identity.

[Footnote 10 If the reader is desirous to see how a great
genius may be influencd by these seemingly trivial
principles of the imagination, as well as the mere vulgar,
let him read my Lord SHAFTSBURYS reasonings concerning the
uniting principle of the universe, and the identity of
plants and animals. See his MORALISTS: or, PHILOSOPHICAL
RHAPSODY.]

Thus the controve