hours these be totally altered; this
hinders not the river from continuing the same during several ages. What
is natural and essential to any thing is, in a manner, expected; and
what is expected makes less impression, and appears of less moment, than
what is unusual and extraordinary. A considerable change of the former
kind seems really less to the imagination, than the most trivial
alteration of the latter; and by breaking less the continuity of the
thought, has less influence in destroying the identity.

We now proceed to explain the nature of personal identity, which has
become so great a question ill philosophy, especially of late years in
England, where all the abstruser sciences are studyed with a peculiar
ardour and application. And here it is evident, the same method of
reasoning must be continued which has so successfully explained the
identity of plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all
the compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature. The
identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one,
and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal
bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed
from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects.

But lest this argument should not convince the reader; though in my
opinion perfectly decisive; let him weigh the following reasoning, which
is still closer and more immediate. It is evident, that the identity,
which we attribute to the human mind, however perfect we may imagine it
to be, is not able to run the several different perceptions into one,
and make them lose their characters of distinction and difference, which
are essential to them. It is still true, that every distinct perception,
which enters into the composition of the mind, is a distinct existence,
and is different, and distinguishable, and separable from every other
perception, either contemporary or successive. But, as, notwithstanding
this distinction and separability, we suppose the whole train of
perceptions to be united by identity, a question naturally arises
concerning this relation of identity; whether it be something that
really binds our several perceptions together, or only associates
their ideas in the imagination. That is, in other words, whether in
pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we observe some real
bond among his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we form of