dor retired, but,
returning in a few hours, demanded a declaration, to be handed in
before midnight, that the further advance of the German troops into
Belgium would cease, otherwise he was instructed to ask for his
passport and England would then protect Belgium. Germany refused, and
the consequence was a declaration of war by England.
That England on the same day sent word to Belgium that she would
resist with her utmost strength any violation of her neutrality is
fully in accordance with the steps taken at Berlin by the English
Ambassador.
Two days before, on August 2, the English Cabinet certainly gave
France the assurance that, in addition to the protection of Belgian
neutrality, she had demanded that there should be no naval action
against France. The contradiction between both points of view is
clearly visible. It appears to me, however, that the only explanation
is that on August 4 England no longer adhered to her standpoint of
August 2, for the German acceptance of the English ultimatum on the
evening of August 4 had wrested from England the moral possibility of
making further claims. If England, on August 4, had sought a pretext
for war, she would have put forward, besides the Belgian demand, also
that referring to the abstention from naval action. But she did not do
so, and confined her ultimatum to the Belgian question, thereby tying
her own hands in the event of Germany accepting the ultimatum. _On
the night of August 4, between the hours of nine and midnight, the
decision as to whether England would remain neutral or no lay with
Germany._
Germany kept to her resolve to violate Belgian neutrality in spite of
the certainty of the English declaration of war resulting therefrom.
That was the first fateful victory of the militarists over the
diplomats in this war. The former were naturally the motive power.
The German military plan was to overrun France and then make a furious
onslaught on Russia. This plan was shattered on the Marne.
In more respects than one, German policy foundered on the heritage
left by Bismarck. Not only was the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine a
lasting obstacle to friendly relations with France, perpetually
forcing the latter into the arms of every anti-German coalition, but
Bismarck's heritage became Germany's curse, because the Germans,
though desirous of following in his footsteps, had no one sufficiently
competent to lead them therein.
Bismarck created the German Empire out
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