fostered an atmosphere of
such terrible hatred and vengeance and stamped the struggle as a war
of annihilation.

England's policy concerning Napoleon III. was more of a diplomatic
than a military nature, and everything tends to show that in the
present case England originally had no intention of joining in the
conflagration, but was content to see Germany weakened by her own
confederates.

So far as I am in a position to review the situation no blame for the
wrongly estimated English attitude can be attached to our ambassadors
in London. Their predictions and warnings were correct, and the final
decision respecting the previously mentioned English ultimatum was
taken in Berlin and not in London. Moreover, the German Foreign
Office would never voluntarily have consented to the acts of violence,
but the military party, who cared neither for diplomatic reports nor
political complications, carried everything before them.

It will always be particularly difficult in a war to define the limits
of military and political spheres of action. The activities of both
encroach to so great an extent on each other as to form one whole, and
very naturally in a war precedence is given to military needs.
Nevertheless, the complete displacement of politicians into
subordinate positions which was effected in Germany and thereby made
manifest the fact that the German Supreme Military Command had
possessed itself of all State power of command, was a misfortune. Had
the politicians at Berlin obtained a hearing there would never have
been any invasion of Belgium, nor yet the ruthless U-boat warfare, the
abstention from which would in both cases have saved the life of the
Central Powers.

From the very first day the Emperor William was as a prisoner in the
hands of his generals.

The blind faith in the invincibility of the army was, like so much
else, an heirloom from Bismarck, and the "Prussian lieutenant,
inimitable save in Germany," became her doom. The entire German people
believed in victory and in an Emperor who flung himself into the arms
of his generals and took upon himself a responsibility far surpassing
the normal limit of what was bearable. Thus the Emperor William
allowed his generals full liberty of action, and, to begin with, their
tactics seemed to be successful. The first battle of the Marne was a
godsend for the Entente in their direst need. But, later, when the war
long since had assumed a totally different character,