pose on us the
resolutions passed in London! For never--as I shall presently
show--had the Entente given up their decision, as they were bound to
Italy, and Italy would allow of no change. Such a policy would have
been as suicide from the sheer fear of death.
In 1917 I once discussed the whole question with the late Dr. Victor
Adler, and pointed out to him the probabilities ensuing from a
separate peace.
Dr. Adler replied: "For God's sake, do not plunge us into a war with
Germany!" After the entry of Bavarian troops into the Tyrol (Adler was
then a secretary in the Foreign Affairs department) he reminded me of
our conversation, and added: "The catastrophe we spoke of then has
arrived. The Tyrol will become a theatre of war."
Everyone in Austria wished for peace. No one wanted a new war--and a
separate peace would have brought about not peace, but a new war with
Germany.
In Hungary, Stephen Tisza ruled with practically unlimited powers; he
was far more powerful than the entire Wekerle Ministry put together.
As applied to Hungary, a separate peace would also have meant the
carrying out of the Entente aims; that is, the loss of the largest and
richest territories in the north and south of Czecho-Slovakia,
Roumania and Serbia. Is there anyone who can honestly maintain that
the Hungarians in 1917 would have agreed to these sacrifices without
putting up the bitterest resistance? Everyone who knows the
circumstances must admit that in this case Tisza would have had the
whole of Hungary behind him in a fierce attack on Vienna. Soon after I
took office I had a long and very serious conversation with him on
the German and the peace questions. Tisza pointed out that the Germans
were difficult to deal with; they were arrogant and despotic; yet
without them we could not bring the war to an end. The proposal to
cede Hungarian territory (Transylvania) and also the plan to enforce
an internal Hungarian reform in favour of the subject nationalities
were matters that were not capable of discussion. The congress in
London in 1915 had adopted resolutions that were quite mad and never
could be realised, and the desire for destruction prevailing in the
Entente could only be suppressed by force. In all circumstances, we
must keep our place by the side of Germany. In Hungary are many
different currents of feeling--but the moment that Vienna prepared to
sacrifice any part of Hungary, the whole country would rise as one man
against suc
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