deris exists_. The Cabinet Council further
resolved that military preparations for the safety of the frontier
be undertaken, which would be an advantage for the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as several hundred miles of its
frontiers would thereby be covered.

"The Prime Minister added that he had already given orders to
strengthen all military posts, after which by degrees general
mobilisation would follow.

"The Government intends only to publish a short communique
relating to the military measures taken for the safety of the
country."

Secondly, it appears incomprehensible why the ultimatum was drawn up
as it was. It was not so much a manifestation of Berchtold's wish for
war, as of other influences, above all that of Tschirsky. In 1870
Bismarck also desired war, but the Ems telegram was of quite a
different character.

In the present case it appears incomprehensible why a Note should have
been selected which by its wording gave umbrage to many who hitherto
were favourably disposed towards us.

Had we, before the ultimatum and after the assassination, secretly and
confidentially furnished proofs to the Great Powers who were not
inimical to us, and especially to England, that trouble was impending
over a political murder staged at Belgrade, we should have evoked a
very different frame of mind in those Governments. Instead, we flung
the ultimatum at them and at the whole of Europe.

It was feared probably at the Ballplatz that any communication to the
Powers would result in their intervention in the form of a new
conference of ambassadors, and that stagnation would ensue. But in the
year 1914 the case was very different from former days--before the
ultimatum right was so undoubtedly on our side.

At all events, the Tschirsky group dreaded such an insipid solution,
and had insisted, therefore, on drastic action. In 1870 Bismarck was
the attacking party, and he succeeded in interchanging the parts. We
also succeeded, but in an opposite sense.

4

Then came our greatest disaster: the German entry into Belgium.

Had England remained neutral we should not have lost the war. In his
book, "Ursachen und Ausbruck des Krieges," page 172, Jagow tells how
on August 4, towards the close of the Reichstag session, the English
Ambassador appeared there and again asked whether Germany would
respect Belgium's neutrality. At that time German troops were already
on Belgian soil. On hearing that, the Ambassa