h action. In that respect there was no difference between
him--Tisza--and Karolyi. Tisza alluded to Karolyi's attitude before
the Roumanian declaration of war, referred to the attitude of
Parliament, and said that if peace were to be made behind Hungary's
back she would separate from Austria and act independently.

I replied that there was no question either of separating from Germany
or of ceding any Hungarian territory, but that we must be quite clear
as to what we had to guard should we be carried further through the
German lust of conquest.

Thereupon Tisza pointed out that the situation was different. It was
not known for certain what had been determined at the conference in
London (the protocol had not then been published), but that Hungarian
territory was promised to Roumania was just as certain as that the
Entente was planning to intervene in Hungarian internal affairs, and
both contingencies were equally unacceptable. Were the Entente to give
Hungary a guarantee for the _status quo ante_ and to desist from any
internal interference it would alter the situation. Until then he must
declare against any attempt at peace.

The conversation as it proceeded became more animated, owing
particularly to my accusing him of viewing all politics from a
Hungarian point of view, which he did not deny, though he maintained
that the dispute was a mere platonic one, as the Entente peace terms
appeared to be such that Austria would be left with much less than
Hungary. I was also first to state the terms under which we could make
peace; then only would it be seen whether extreme pressure brought to
bear on Germany were advisable or not. There was no sense in Germany's
advocating peace if she intended to continue fighting. For Germany was
fighting above all for the integrity of the Monarchy, which would be
lost the moment Germany laid down her arms. Whatever German
politicians and generals said was of little consequence. As long as
England remained bent on satisfying her Allies with our territory,
Germany was the only protection against these plans.

Tisza had no desire for conquest beyond a frontier protection from
Roumania, and he was decidedly opposed to the dismemberment of new
states (Poland); that would be to weaken not to strengthen Hungary.

After a lengthy discussion we agreed to bind ourselves to the
following policy:

(1) So long, as the determination made at the conference in
London, i.e. the destruct