in the published report of my aforesaid
speech, where I say: "A victory peace was out of the question; we are
therefore compelled to effect a peace with sacrifice." The Imperial
offer to cede Galicia to Poland, and, indirectly, to Germany, arose
out of this train of thought, as did all the peace proposals to the
Entente, which always clearly intimated that we were ready for
_endurable_ sacrifices.
It had always been obvious that the Entente would tear the Monarchy in
shreds, both in the event of a peace of understanding and of a
separate peace. It was quite in keeping with the terms of the Pact of
London of April 26, 1915.
The resolutions passed at that congress which prepared for Italy's
entry into the war, determined the further course of the war, for they
included the division of the Monarchy, and forced us, therefore, into
a desperate war of defence. I believe that London and Paris, at times
when the fortune of war was on our side, both regretted the
resolutions that had been adopted, as they prevented the dwellers on
both the Seine and the Thames from making any temporarily desired
advances to us.
As far back as 1915 we received vague news of the contents of this
strictly secret London agreement; but only in February, 1917, did we
obtain the authentic whole, when the Russian revolutionary Government
published a protocol referring to it, which subsequently was
reproduced in our papers.
I add this protocol to the appendix of the book,[3] as, in spite of
its being so eminently important, it has not received adequate
attention on the part of the public.
According to the settlements, which were binding on the four
States--England, France, Russia, and Italy--the last-named was awarded
the Trentino, the whole of South Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass,
Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca, the whole of Istria with a number of
islands, also Dalmatia.
In the course of the war the Entente had further made binding promises
to the Roumanians and Serbians, hence the need for the dissolution of
the Monarchy.
Having made these statements, I wish to explain why a separate peace
was a sheer impossibility for us. In other words, what were the
reasons that prevented us from ending the war and becoming
neutral--reasons which only left one possibility open to us: to change
our adversary, and instead of fighting the Entente, together with
Germany, to join the Entente and with her fight against Germany? It
must, above all, be kep
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