is a
sound rule that the people are generally better than their
representatives--wiser of counsel, more disinterested of judgment--and it
is therefore provided in the Constitution that there shall be an Assembly
of Representatives, but that the people may require of that Assembly that
laws be referred to them for final decision, or that laws be made to suit
their desire.
The most important part of these legislative provisions, however, is the
setting up of a National Assembly, or Synod, to be known as the
Oireachtas. This is to be formed of two Houses, Dail Eireann and Seanad
Eireann. There are many powerful arguments against the two-chamber system.
In the end they all resolve themselves into a question of ultimate
responsibility. In a simple illustration, if there be one thimble and one
pea, it is easy enough to know where the pea is. But directly a second
thimble is brought up beside the first, the difficulty of placing the pea
becomes at once a problem. On the other hand, the arguments in favour of a
second-chamber system also resolve themselves into a question of
responsibility. For if there is only one chamber, without a second to
check it and act together with it, there is, it is argued, a greater
likelihood of its acting in an irresponsible manner, and of its running
into hasty, ill-advised legislation. Its members, having acquired the
habit of concerted action, may moreover strike a bargain behind the
people's back, even while preserving all the forms of opposition and
discussion. With the two instruments of the Referendum and the Initiative
in operation this danger is less likely, provided that the people be
sufficiently alert. Yet it exists. In most countries, therefore, two
chambers are the rule; and in our Constitution it is provided that there
shall be two chambers, care being taken to fix responsibility ultimately
in the first in case of doubt or delay.
Given two chambers, the difficulty is the creation of the Second Chamber.
The First Chamber causes little difficulty, and is mainly a matter, not
for the Constitution, but for an Electoral Law. The Second Chamber is a
matter for the Constitution. Indeed, the question and creation of a Second
Chamber, and the formation of the Executive Power, are the two foremost
problems for the making of every Constitution. The first difficulty is to
find for the Second Chamber a sufficient constituency, and the second
difficulty is to find for it a proper function; an
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