h, the right to allow such appeals to the Judicial
Committee is based, ultimately, on the acknowledgment of the supremacy of
British legislation; and the plain intention of our Constitution is that
this supremacy is not acknowledged, each party to the Treaty being a
co-equal member of a larger Community. Not only, therefore, are the
practical reasons against such a right of appeal, but there is no
substance in the Constitution to make such a right allowable.
There is, indeed, nothing that can be said in favour of such a provision,
from the point of view either of justice, of law, of equity or of harmony.
If it be destined to remain, it is to be hoped that it will remain a dead
letter. Otherwise it will lead to boundless friction and ill-will,
internal and external.
Yet there is an excellent principle embedded in this provision. It is very
deeply, and perhaps almost inextricably, embedded; but it is there. For
if a number of nations are to join together as co-equal members of a
Community, plainly there should be some common Court to which all can
appeal with equal confidence. Ireland and England, for instance, have made
a Treaty. Either side may violate that Treaty. Who is to judge between
them? Is the appeal to be to the arbitrament of strength? If so, what of
the co-equality of the Community? It becomes an idle phrase, however
separate one may claim to be from the other.
The case may be carried even further. A case exists for such a Court, not
only in respect of their interdependent relations, but not less in respect
of their internal relations. It may even happen that the citizen of a
State, or a combination of citizens, may have a plain case to be carried
to such a Court as against their State, if a Court of sufficient
impartiality could be established. States are not always immaculate of
justice, particularly to minorities.
Can such a Court be found? I believe it can. An exposition of the present
draft of our Constitution is not the place to give the details of such an
alternative. It is sufficient to say that there is such an alternative,
for which provision could therefore be made in substitution of the present
provision, against which the requirements of justice and the entire
experience of the Commonwealth rises in evidence.
VIII.
FUNCTIONAL COUNCILS.
It is the duty of a Constitution, not merely to provide for the present,
but to leave itself lissom and flexible for the development of the future.
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