of ordinary legislation, and surrendered if they prove
impracticable. It is one thing to experiment--which a Constitution should
allow. It is another thing to be pledged to one's experiments for
ever--which is what a Constitutional provision is intended to mean.

The experimental nature of the provisions for the Executive in the present
draft of the Constitution is manifest. They are unlike anything in any
Constitution. They are quite unlike the provisions in the Swiss
Constitution, from which the inspiration is supposed to be derived.
Switzerland is a Confederation, consisting of twenty-two sovereign
cantons, where only limited powers are conferred on the federal
authorities. The twenty-two sovereign cantons differ widely in religion,
language, habits and traditions. They are jealous of the federal
authorities, and jealous of one another, and therefore insist that the
Federal Council (which acts as the Executive), as well as the Federal
Assembly, shall be representative directly of the languages, religions and
traditions of different parts of the country. Certain of the larger towns
and cantons, indeed, claim prescriptive rights to the appointment of
members of the Federal Council. This Council, therefore, is appointed for
the whole term of the Assembly by the two chambers of the Assembly sitting
together, and are chosen by the two chambers, as the Constitution says,
"from among all Swiss citizens eligible to the National Council." The
members of the Council may speak, and propose motions, in both chambers,
but they may not vote in either, for they form a separate institution
outside the Assembly.

It is well to see what are the provisions for the Executive Power under
the Swiss Constitution in order to note how widely the Executive in our
draft differs from them. Good or bad, our draft stands or falls by itself,
and cannot depend from the Swiss example, from which it differs both in
itself and in the circumstance which it is designed to meet. The intention
may be of the noblest; but intentions are only prophecies; and the
Fundamental Law of a Constitution is scarcely the place to commit a whole
people to a prophecy. The intention is to overcome party government, and
is conceived at a time when parties are divided along lines that do not
represent the economic issues that ordinarily influence the course of
legislation. For parties, in so far as parties represent true economic
issues, are a natural and inevitable medium