r this reason, the people's own choice of Senators is necessary to their
efficiency and authority. In countries formed out of a Confederation this
difficulty is evaded by the creation of the Senate from the Federated
States, while creating the First Chamber directly from the whole people.
But where there are no Federated States the people's direct bestowal of
authority cannot be evaded if friction and loss of strength are to be
avoided. Thus one returns to the original problem, which is, how the
people shall choose a Senate which will not be a copy of the Chamber of
Deputies, and how the Senatorial Person will find his way to the councils
of the nation, bringing with him an unanswerable authority.
Our Constitution meets this by making the whole country one constituency
for the election of the Senate. The Deputies are elected from localities
where they are known, and the special interests of which they are
qualified to represent. Over those interests the major interest of the
whole nation stands guard. It would be possible for persons to enter the
Chamber of Deputies who are not known outside their own localities, but
who are qualified to represent those localities. But by making the entire
country one constituency for the election of the Senate, no merely local
interest will have power to secure election. And thus it will be possible
to find a place for the Senatorial Person from, as the Constitution reads,
"citizens who have done honour to the nation by reason of useful public
service, or who, because of special qualifications or attainments,
represent important aspects of the nation's life." These persons are to be
elected by Proportional Representation; and in order that the business of
election shall not prove too cumbersome it is appointed that one-fourth of
the Senate shall retire every three years, and that before each election a
list shall be prepared by both Houses consisting of at least three times
as many persons as there are vacancies to be filled.
Such form the two Houses of the Oireachtas. Their relation to one another
is carefully defined. The Seanad is created as an advisory and delaying
body, and the ultimate responsibility is given to the Dail. But endowed,
as it is, with so strong an authority, vested in it by the entire nation
voting as a whole, it is unlikely that its criticisms and advice can be
neglected. For such criticisms will be furnished in the course of debates
that will be read by the whol
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