considered to have brought it up to more than
an improved PEACE _establishment_, such as we have often had during
profound peace in Europe; but even these ten thousand men are not
yet obtained. We have nearly pledged ourselves to sending twenty-five
thousand men to the East, and this pledge will have to be redeemed.
To keep even such a force up in the field will require a strong,
available reserve at home, of which we shall be quite denuded. But we
are going to make war upon Russia! encouraging Austria and Prussia to
do so likewise, whereby we assume a moral obligation not to leave them
without assistance. We engage in a War which may assume in its course
a totally different character from that of its beginning. Who can say
it is impossible that our own shores may be threatened by powers now
in alliance with us? We are powerless for offence or defence without
a _trained_ Army; to obtain this will require considerable time. The
Queen must, therefore, urge Lord Aberdeen to consider with the Cabinet
whether it will not be essential to augment the Army at once, and by
at least thirty thousand men. Considerations of home policy make this
also advisable; the country is eager for War at this moment, and ready
to grant men and money. It will be a great facility hereafter to have
obtained what is most needed at first. If the force should finally not
be wanted, retrenchments may very easily be made. The Crown should
at least have the power of raising the men without the necessity for
further application to Parliament.

[Pageheading: THE BRITISH ULTIMATUM]

_The Earl of Aberdeen to Queen Victoria._

LONDON, _26th February 1854._

Lord Aberdeen, with his humble duty, begs to inform your Majesty that
another Cabinet was held to-day, in order to consider the draft of
a letter which it is proposed that Lord Clarendon should address to
Count Nesselrode, and in which he should summon the Russian Government
to evacuate the Principalities. The messenger will be directed to wait
six days for an answer, and the British Government will consider
the refusal or the silence of Count Nesselrode as equivalent to a
declaration of War, and proceed to act accordingly.[15]

An assurance has been received, in general terms, of the intention
of Austria to support this demand; and a telegraphic message has been
sent to Vienna with a desire to know whether the Austrian Government
will join in this summons, or in what manner support will be