to await events in
the Bosphorus, and our armies at Constantinople, such position being
highly honourable and advantageous to us in the eyes of Europe, and
certainly not nearly so favourable to Russia; that he was certainly
sensible that the English Government had not pressed him, feeling
as they had done the extreme delicacy of his position, and the great
extent of his frontier so easily attacked; that he did not wish to say
now, till the moment of decision came, thinking it more honourable
and straightforward not to raise false expectations, but that his
interests being so completely with us, should the Emperor of Russia
do nothing in the honourable direction he hoped to see him adopt, he
should then consider himself called upon to express frankly to us what
he proposed to do, in order that our action might become united and
of advantage to one another. He further thought that the treaty with
Prussia would greatly facilitate all this, as Prussia had acceded to
the wishes of Austria in the event of certain eventualities, which,
however, for the moment are not named, but which, as far as I
understand, go to the length of leaving Austria unfettered to act as
she likes at the moment when she considers her so doing essential to
her position as a young Empire. It is quite evident to me that this is
the general feeling here, amongst all those who have any weight in the
councils of the Empire. These are _Austrian_ views, and I must say I
can understand them and appreciate them as such. I am confident, I am
certain, they are _honest_ on the part of the Emperor, and I doubt
not he will carry them through to the letter, for I am confident
the Emperor never would say what he did not mean. Rely upon it, this
Country will never go with Russia; she knows her interests too well
for that; she would like to avoid a War altogether if she could,
and with that view she would be delighted to see some honourable and
acceptable proposal made, but should this fail she will then take a
very decided line, and that line will be in accordance with Austrian
interests--which means with us. I find that most of the more prudent
people, and many of those in high office, are fully alive to the
advantages of the English alliance, and would wish to see this
alliance confirmed _de novo_; and I think it would be very well for us
to meet them half-way with this. But then it would be better to avoid
all after-dinner speeches such as those at the Reform Club,