ucceed in restraining French impatience as he has often done before.

[Footnote 51: Lord Clarendon had given the Queen the two
reasons for which the French were pressing, in anticipation,
the retention of the Crimea, viz. as affording suitable winter
quarters, and as a guarantee in case of peace negotiations.
On the 7th of September the allied forces had sailed for the
Crimea; on the 21st the Queen learned by telegram that 25,000
English, 25,000 French, and 8,000 Turks had landed safely
without encountering resistance, and begun the march to
Sebastopol. The Queen, with her usual kindly solicitude for
the health and comfort of her Ministers, had summoned Lord
Aberdeen from London to have the benefit of the Scotch air; he
remained at Balmoral from the 27th till the 30th, when he went
to his own house at Haddo. Immediately after his departure, a
telegram arrived from Lord Clarendon announcing the victory of
the Alma.]

[Pageheading: BATTLE OF THE ALMA]

_The Earl of Aberdeen to Queen Victoria._

HADDO HOUSE, _1st October 1854._

Lord Aberdeen presents his humble duty to your Majesty. He had the
honour of receiving your Majesty's box this morning at nine o'clock
by post; and he now sends a Messenger to Aberdeen, with Despatches
received this morning from London, to meet the special conveyance to
Balmoral this evening.

Lord Aberdeen humbly presumes to offer his most cordial
congratulations to your Majesty on the great intelligence received
by telegraph this morning. The account sent by Lord Stratford of
the victory on the Alma must be correct; the report mentioned by Mr
Colquhoun[52] may possibly be so too. At all events, we may fairly
hope that the fall of Sebastopol cannot long be delayed.

Lord Aberdeen has written to Lord Clarendon this morning on the
subject of the fortifications of Sebastopol, which although, somewhat
embarrassing at the moment, is not attended with any great practical
importance.

Lord Aberdeen regrets that the speedy return of the post prevents him
from sending your Majesty a copy of his letter, which in substance,
however, was to the following effect. Without attaching any undue
importance to the decision, he was inclined to adhere to his first
proposition of the immediate and entire destruction of the works.
He did not see the advantage of doing the thing by halves; while the
destruction of the sea defences only might g