rting from Sackett's Harbor as a base. Chauncey, whose
charge extended no farther than the upper rapids of the St. Lawrence,
had of course no other interest. His first plan, transmitted to the
Navy Department January 21, 1813,[41] had been to proceed immediately
upon the opening of navigation, with the fleet and a land force of a
thousand picked troops, against Kingston, the capture of which, if
effected, would solve at a single stroke every difficulty in the upper
territory. No other harbor was tenable as a naval station; with its
fall, and the destruction of shipping and forts, would go the control
of the lake, even if the place itself were not permanently held.
Deprived thus of the water communications, the enemy could retain no
position to the westward, because neither re-enforcements nor supplies
could reach them. To quote Chauncey's own words, "I have no doubt we
should succeed in taking or destroying their ships and forts, and, of
course, preserve our ascendency on this lake."

This remark, though sound, was narrow in scope; for it failed to
recognize, what was perfectly knowable, that the British support of
the Lake Erie stations and the upper country depended on their power
to control, or at worst to contest, Ontario. Of this they themselves
were conscious, as the words of Yeo and Brock alike testify. The new
American Secretary of War, Armstrong, who was a man of correct
strategical judgment and considerable military information, entered
heartily into this view; and in a letter dated February 10
communicated to Dearborn the orders of the President for his
operations, based upon the Secretary's recommendation.[42] Four
thousand men were to be assembled at Sackett's, and three thousand at
Buffalo. The former, under convoy of the fleet, was to proceed first
against Kingston, then against York (Toronto). After this the two
corps should co-operate in an attack to be made upon the British
Niagara frontier, which rested upon Fort George on the Ontario shore,
and Fort Erie upon Lake Erie. This plan was adopted upon the
assumption, which was probably correct, that the enemy's entire
military force upon Ontario did not exceed twenty-one hundred regular
troops, of whom six hundred were at Kingston and twelve hundred at
Niagara. Armstrong, who recognized the paramount importance of
Montreal, had received the exaggerated impression that there might be
in that neighborhood eight to ten thousand regulars. There were not
yet