er in order to ensure the felicity of
remote posterity--a theory which offends his sense of justice and
fitness. On the contrary, man can realise happiness equally in every
stage of civilisation. All forms of society are equally legitimate, the
imperfect as well as the perfect; all are ends in themselves, not mere
stages on the way to something better. And a people which is happy in
one of these inferior states has a perfect right to remain in it.

Thus the Progress which Herder sees is, to use his own geometrical
illustration, a sequence of unequal and broken curves, corresponding
to different maxima and minima. Each curve has its own equation, the
history of each people is subject to the laws of its own environment;
but there is no general law controlling the whole career of humanity.
[Footnote: Ib. xv. 3. The power of ideas in history, which Herder failed
to appreciate, was recognised by a contemporary savant from whom he
might have learned. Jakob Wegelin, a Swiss, had, at the invitation of
Frederick the Great, settled in Berlin, where he spent the last years of
his life and devoted his study to the theory of history. His merit was
to have perceived that "external facts are penetrated and governed by
spiritual forces and guiding ideas, and that the essential and permanent
in history is conditioned by the nature and development of ideas."
(Dierauer, quoted by Bock, op. cit. p. 13.) He believed in the
progressive development of mankind as a whole, but as his learned
brochures seem to have exerted no influence, it would be useless here to
examine more closely his views, which are buried in the transactions
of the Prussian Academy of Science. In Switzerland he came under the
influence of Rousseau and d'Alembert. After he moved to Berlin (1765)
he fell under that of Leibnitz. It may be noted (1) that he deprecated
attempts at writing a universal history as premature until an adequate
knowledge of facts had been gained, and this would demand long
preliminary labours; (2) that he discussed the question whether history
is an indefinite progression or a series of constant cycles, and decided
for the former view. (Memoire sur le cours periodique, 1785).
Bock's monograph is the best study of Wegelin; but see also Flint's
observations in Philosophy of History, vol. i. (1874).]

Herder brought down his historical survey only as far as the sixteenth
century. It has been suggested [Footnote: Javary, De l'idee de progres,
p. 69.] t