l those
to whom Voltairianism was an accursed thing, and for a generation
he exercised a considerable influence. But his work--and this is
the important point for us--helped to diffuse the idea, which the
ideologists were diffusing on very different lines--that human history
has been a progressive development.

Progressive development was also the theme of Jouffroy in his slight but
suggestive introduction to the philosophy of history (1825),
[Footnote: "Reflexions sur la philosophie de l'histoire," in Melanges
philosophiques, 2nd edition, 1838.] in which he posed the same problem
which, as we shall see, Saint-Simon and Comte were simultaneously
attempting to solve. He had not fallen under the glamour of German
idealism, and his results have more affinity with Vico's than with
Hegel's.

He begins with some simple considerations which conduct to the doubtful
conclusion that all the historical changes in man's condition are due to
the operation of his intelligence. The historian's business is to trace
the succession of the actual changes. The business of the philosopher of
history is to trace the succession of ideas and study the correspondence
between the two developments. This is the true philosophy of history:
"the glory of our age is to understand it."

Now it is admitted to-day, he says, that the human intelligence
obeys invariable laws, so that a further problem remains. The actual
succession of ideas has to be deduced from these necessary laws. When
that deduction is effected--a long time hence--history will disappear;
it will be merged in science.

Jouffroy then presented the world with what he calls the FATALITY OF
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT, to take the place of Providence or Destiny.
It is a fatality, he is careful to explain, which, so far from
compromising, presupposes individual liberty. For it is not like the
fatality of sensual impulse which guides the brute creation. What it
implies is this: if a thousand men have the same idea of what is good,
this idea will govern their conduct in spite of their passions, because,
being reasonable and free, they are not blindly submissive to passion,
but can deliberate and choose.

This explanation of history as a necessary development of society
corresponding to a necessary succession of ideas differs in two
important points from the explanations of Hegel and Cousin. The
succession of ideas is not conceived as a transcendent logic, but is
determined by the laws of