erke, i. 3, p. 603). In this context he says
that the conception of an infinite "progressivity" is included in the
conception of "history," but adds that the perfectibility of the race
cannot be directly inferred. For it may be said that man has no
proper history but turns round on a wheel of Ixion. The difficulty of
establishing the fact of Progress from the course of events lies in
discovering a criterion. Schelling rejects the criterion of moral
improvement and that of advance in science and arts as unpractical
or misleading. But if we see the sole object of history in a gradual
realisation of the ideal state, we have a measure of Progress which can
be applied; though it cannot be proved either by theory or by experience
that the goal will be attained. This must remain an article of faith
(ib. 592 sqq.).]

Schelling influenced, among others, his contemporary Krause, a less
familiar name, who worked out a philosophy of history in which this idea
is fundamental. Krause conceived history, which is the expression of the
Absolute, as the development of life; society as an organism; and
social growth as a process which can be deduced from abstract biological
principles.

[Footnote: Krause divided man's earthly career into three Ages--infancy,
growth, and maturity. The second of these falls into three periods
characterised by (1) polytheism, (2) monotheism (Middle Ages), (3)
scepticism and liberty, and we are now in the third of these periods.
The third Age will witness the union of humanity in a single social
organism, and the universal acceptance of "panentheism" (the doctrine of
the unity of all in God), which is the principle of Krause's philosophy
and religion. But though this will be the final stage on the earth,
Krause contemplates an ulterior career of humanity in other solar
systems.

Krause never attracted attention in England, but he exerted
some influence in France and Spain, and especially in Belgium,
notwithstanding the grotesque jargon in which he obscured his thoughts.
See Flint, Philosophy of History, pp. 474-5. Flint's account of his
speculations is indulgent. The main ideas of his philosophy of history
will be found in the Introduction a la philosophie (ed. 2, 1880) of G.
Tiberghien, a Belgian disciple.]

All these transcendent speculations had this in common that they
pretended to discover the necessary course of human history on
metaphysical principles, independent of experience. But it has been
r