eason, as
art.] But there are no locked gates between these periods; they overlap
and mingle; each may have some of the characteristics of another; and in
each there is a vanguard leading the way and a rearguard lagging behind.

At present (1804) we are in the third age; we have broken with
authority, but do not yet possess a clear and disciplined knowledge of
reason. [Footnote: Three years later, however, Fichte maintained in his
patriotic Discourses to the German Nation (1807) that in 1804 man had
crossed the threshold of the fourth epoch. He asserted that the progress
of "culture" and science will depend henceforward chiefly on Germany.]
Fichte has deduced this scheme purely a priori without any reference
to actual experience. "The philosopher," he says, "follows the a priori
thread of the world-plan which is clear to him without any history;
and if he makes use of history, it is not to prove anything, since his
theses are already proved independently of all history."

Historical development is thus presented as a necessary progress towards
a goal which is known but cannot be reached. And this fact as to the
destiny of the race constitutes the basis of morality, of which
the fundamental law is to act in such a way as to promote the free
realisation of reason upon earth. It has been claimed by a recent critic
that Fichte was the first modern philosopher to humanise morals. He
completely rejected the individualistic conception which underlay
Kantian as well as Christian ethics. He asserted that the true motive of
morality is not the salvation of the individual man but the Progress of
humanity. In fact, with Fichte Progress is the principle of ethics. That
the Christian ideal of ascetic saintliness detached from society has
no moral value is a plain corollary from the idea of earthly Progress.
[Footnote: X. Leon, La Philosophie de Fichte (1902), pp. 477-9.]

One other point in Fichte's survey of history deserves notice--the
social role of the savant. It is the function of the savant to discover
the truths which are a condition of moral progress; he may be said
to incarnate reason in the world. We shall see how this idea played
a prominent part in the social schemes of Saint-Simon and Comte.
[Footnote: Fichte, Ueber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten (1794).]

5.

Hegel's philosophy of history is better known than Fichte's. Like
Fichte, he deduced the phases a priori from his metaphysical principles,
but he condescended t