not fall in part on
the children of traitors, rather than wholly (as in part it must) on our
children.

As to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_:
many foolish and disloyal people, out of the folly and disloyalty of
their hearts, talk as if the thing itself were something wicked and
monstrous; although the Constitution plainly provides that it may be
done, 'when, in cases of rebellion and invasion, the public safety may
require it.' Who is to judge of the necessity, and who is to exercise
the power of suspending it, the Constitution does not declare; and in
the silence of the Constitution and in the absence of any legislation on
the point, the President might well presume that the discretion of
exercising a power constitutionally vested somewhere, and designed to be
exercised in emergencies of public peril, liable to arise when Congress
might not be in session, was left to him. At all events, he took the
responsibility of deciding that the public safety required its exercise.
Congress has since justified his course, and legalized the power in his
hands. The loyal people of the nation approve its action.

And finally, the constitutional right in certain cases to suspend the
ordinary privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ carries with it, of
course, an equally constitutional right to make what you call 'arbitrary
arrests.' The very object of granting the power to vacate the privilege
of the writ is to enable the Executive to hold in custody such persons
as it may judge the 'public safety requires' the holding of--without its
purpose being frustrated by judicial interference. But the power to
_hold_ in custody is utterly nugatory, if there be no power to _take_
into custody. To suppose that the Constitution grants the one, but
denies the other, is to suppose it self-stultified by contradictory
provisions--and that in a case where the public safety in time of
imminent peril is concerned. The only consistent and sensible view of
the Constitution is, that as the validity of the writ of _habeas corpus_
is the ordinary rule, and its suspension the extraordinary exception--so
the power to make arrests by civil process only is the ordinary rule,
and the power to make arrests by military or executive authority is the
extraordinary exception--both exceptions alike holding 'when, in cases
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require.' In such cases
the ordinary guarantees of personal liberty