ides, what object could you have? You vindicate the doctrine, 'the
great truth,' by which (according to you, as according to Mr. Stephens)
slavery as an institution is justified. You approve of slavery, or, as
Mr. Stephens euphistically terms it, the 'subordination of the negro to
the superior race.' You know that slavery _is_ a fundamental institution
in the rebel scheme. Why then take pains to produce a contrary
impression, by resorting to such futile distinctions, such wretched
quibbles, and such absurd logic? It seems to me nothing but a mania for
verbal distinctions and sophistical special pleas can explain such a
gratuitous self-sacrifice.

Or is it, possibly, that you thought you could persuade your 'plain men
who read pamphlets,' that in virtue of the sweet euphuism,
'subordination to the superior race,' negro slavery at the South was in
some way to be divinely transformed, and, though called slavery, was not
in fact to be slavery after the old former fashion? '_Subordination to
the superior race_'! It certainly merits the praise of Mr. Justice
_Shallow_: 'It is well said, in faith, sir; and it is well said indeed,
too; ... and it is good, yea, indeed is it: good phrases are surely, and
ever were, very commendable. Very good; a good phrase!'

But _you_ knew it was to be the _same sort of subordination_ that has
always prevailed at the South. What is that? It is a subordination that
is legally determined as follows: 'Slaves shall be deemed, held, taken,
reputed, and adjudged in law to be '_chattels personal_ in the hands of
their owners and possessors, and their executors, administrators, and
assigns, to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatever.' (South
Carolina Laws, 2 Brevard's Digest, 229.) 'A slave is one who is in the
full power of a master to whom he belongs. The master may sell him,
dispose of his person, his industry, and his labor. He can do nothing,
possess nothing, nor acquire anything but what must belong to his
master.' (Louisiana Civil Code, art. 35.) 'The slave is entirely subject
to the will of his master.' (Idem, art. 173.)

This is the legal condition of the slave--the same in all the
slaveholding States. The laws and decisions resting upon this principle
of chattelhood and absolute ownership and dominion are too numerous to
cite. They may be summed up in the words of Judge Crenshaw (1 Stewart's
Ala. Rep., 320): '_the slave has no civil rights_.' It is matter of
settled law, that he c