try
and deal with the advancing forces in detail, and disperse them, if
possible, before the concentration could be effected. I had, however,
but a very imperfect idea of the extent of the combination, or of
the enormous numbers arrayed against us. My intelligence was most
defective; neither the nature of the country nor the attitude of the
people admitted of extended reconnaissances, and I was almost entirely
dependent for information on Afghan sources. Some of the Afghan
soldiers in our ranks aided me to the best of their ability, but by
the Sirdars, notably Wali Mahomed Khan, I was, either wilfully or from
ignorance, grossly misinformed as to the formidable character of the
rising. But that there was serious trouble ahead was plain enough when
the conflicting reports had been carefully sifted, and I therefore
thought it only prudent to telegraph to General Bright at Jalalabad to
push on the Guide Corps, although I was very much averse to augmenting
the Sherpur garrison, and thereby increasing the drain on our
supplies.

In the meantime immediate action was necessary to carry out my idea of
preventing the different sections of the enemy concentrating at Kabul.
I accordingly prepared two columns: one under Macpherson, whose orders
were to attack the tribesmen coming from the north before they could
join those advancing from the west; the other under Baker, who was
instructed to place himself across the line by which the enemy would
have to retreat when beaten, as I hoped they would be, by Macpherson.

Macpherson[5] started on the 8th towards Kila Aushar, about three
miles from Sherpur, _en route_ to Arghandeh. And on the following
morning Baker, with a small force,[6] proceeded to Chihal Dukhteran,
giving out that his destination was the Logar valley, and that he
would march by Charasia, as I had directed him to make a feint in that
direction, and then to turn to the west, and place himself between
Arghandeh and Maidan, on the Ghazni road.

To give Baker time to carry out this movement, I halted Macpherson at
Kila Aushar on the 9th, whence he sent out two reconnoitring
parties--one in the direction of Kohistan, the other, in charge of
Lieutenant-Colonel Lockhart,[7] A.Q.M.G., towards Arghandeh.

The intelligence brought in induced me to change my orders to
Macpherson. The first party reported that a very considerable force of
Kohistanis had collected at Karez-i-Mir, about ten miles north of
Kila Aushar, while Lock