advance
through their country; they knew that their homes and property would
be at our mercy should we be victorious, and they were uncertain as to
Baker's movements.

On the morning of the 11th December,[8] therefore, only one section
was actually in opposition to us, that led by Mahomed Jan, who during
the night of the 10th had taken up a position near the group of
villages known as Kila Kazi.

Further, I felt that Mahomed Jan must be disheartened at our recent
success, and at his failure to induce the Logaris to join him, and
doubtless felt that a movement towards Kabul would expose his left
flank to Macpherson, while his rear would be threatened by Baker.

The strength of Baker's and Macpherson's columns had been carefully
considered, as well as the routes they were to take. I was thoroughly
well acquainted with the ground comprised in the theatre of the
proposed operations, having frequently ridden over it during the
preceding two months; I was thus able to calculate to a nicety the
difficulties each column would have to encounter and the distances
they would have to cover, and arrange with the utmost precision the
hour at which each Commander should move off to insure a timely
junction. So that when I left Sherpur at ten o'clock on the 11th
December to take command of Macpherson's and Massy's columns as soon
as they should unite, I had no misgivings, and was sanguine that my
carefully arranged programme would result in the discomfiture of
Mahomed Jan; but the events which followed on that day afforded a
striking exemplification of the uncertainty of war, and of how even a
very slight divergence from a General's orders may upset plans made
with the greatest care and thought, and lead to disastrous results.

Massy could not have clearly understood the part he was meant to take
in co-operation with Macpherson, for instead of following the route I
had directed him to take, he marched straight across country to the
Ghazni road, which brought him face to face with the enemy before he
could be joined by Macpherson. In his explanatory report Massy stated
that he had been misled by a memorandum[9] which he received from the
Assistant Adjutant-General after his interview with me (although this
memorandum contained nothing contradictory of the orders I had given
him); that he understood from it that his business was to reach the
Ghazni road at its nearest point in the direction of Arghandeh, and
that he thought it bette