ed himself. Our casualties were one officer
(Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh) and six men wounded.

It was evident that the tribesmen from the directions of Arghandeh and
Paghman intended to ascend the Surkh Kotal, but suddenly they appeared
to change their minds, on discovering, probably, that our troops
held all the commanding positions and that their allies were in full
flight.

Soon after noon on the 10th I received the report of Macpherson's
success and the enemy's retirement towards Arghandeh. I at once sent
off Lieutenant-Colonel B. Gordon, R.H.A., with orders to intercept
them with the Horse Artillery and Cavalry at Aushar; but when I rode
over myself later in the day to that place, I was much disappointed to
find that Gordon had not been able to give effect to my instructions,
as the enemy, on perceiving his troops, dispersed and took shelter in
the surrounding villages and on the slopes of the hills.

Macpherson encamped for the night between the Surkh Kotal and
Karez-i-Mir, and Baker, who had steadily pursued his march along a
very difficult road, halted a short distance west of Maidan and eight
miles only from Arghandeh.

To Macpherson I sent orders to march very early the next morning--the
11th--through Paghman towards Arghandeh and in Baker's direction; at
the same time I informed him that Massy, whom I had placed in command
of the troops at Aushar, would, according to directions from me, leave
that place at nine o'clock to co-operate with him, _via_ the Arghandeh
and Ghazni road. That evening Massy came to my room, and I carefully
explained to him his part in the next day's proceedings; I told him
that he was to advance cautiously and quietly by the road leading
directly from the city of Kabul towards Arghandeh, feeling for
the enemy; that he was to communicate with Macpherson and act in
conformity with that officer's movements; and I impressed upon him
that he was on no account to commit himself to an action until
Macpherson had engaged the enemy.

Up to this time the combination of tribesmen, which later proved so
formidable, had not been effected; Macpherson for the time being had
dispersed the Kohistanis and checked the force advancing from Ghazni
under the leadership of Mahomed Jan; the Logaris and Ghilzais were
merely watching events, and waiting to see how it fared with the
Kohistani and Ghazni factions, before committing themselves to
hostilities; they had but recently witnessed our successful