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tewart as Chief of the Staff, and the latter taking up the same position with me.] [Footnote 6: Lieutenant-General Primrose succeeded Sir Donald Stewart in command of the troops at Kandahar.] * * * * * CHAPTER LX. 1880 Affairs at Kandahar--The Maiwand disaster --Relief from Kabul suggested--A force ordered from Kabul --Preparations for the march--The Kabul-Kandahar Field Force --Commissariat and Transport For more than six months rumours had been afloat of Ayub Khan's determination to advance on Kandahar; but little attention was paid to them by the authorities at that place until towards the end of May, when a Sirdar, named Sher Ali,[1] who had been a few days before formally installed as Wali, or Ruler, of Kandahar, informed the political officer, Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, that the British occupation of Kabul had had the effect of bringing about a reconciliation between the various chiefs at Herat, who had placed themselves under the leadership of Ayub Khan and induced him to proclaim a _jahad_. Sher Ali, who evidently considered this news authentic, declared his belief that his own troops,[2] who were then engaged in collecting revenue in Zamindawar, would desert to Ayub Khan as he approached Kandahar, and he begged that a brigade of British soldiers might be sent to Girishk to support him. On General Primrose communicating this information to the Commander-in-Chief in India, he recommended to the Government that the Bombay reserve division, located at Jacobabad, Hyderabad, and Karachi, should be mobilized so soon as it became certain that Ayub Khan really contemplated this move, as in his opinion the garrison at Kandahar would be left dangerously weak after a brigade had been detached for Girishk. Ayub Khan's movements, however, were not ascertained until the 27th June, when he had advanced halfway to the Helmand; it was too late then to mobilize troops so far off as Jacobabad, Hyderabad, and Karachi with any chance of their being in time to check his onward march. The news of his approach spread rapidly, and had the most disturbing effect in Kandahar and its neighbourhood. The Governor's authority daily diminished, and many of the inhabitants left the city. Ayub Khan had with him, when he started from Herat on the 15th June, 7,500 men and ten guns as the nucleus of an army, which he calculated, as he moved forward, would be strongly reinforced by
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