and some of our troops moved out to
dislodge them from those places from which they could specially annoy
us. I destroyed some of the forts, and removed other cover in the
immediate vicinity of the walls; but I did not undertake any large
sorties, for to have attempted to drive the enemy out of the outlying
posts, which I could not then have held, would have been a useless
waste of strength.

My chief trouble at this time was the presence of the Afghan Sirdars
within the cantonment. I had good reason to believe that some of them,
though full of protestations of friendship, had been in communication
with Mahomed Jan, the high-priest Mushk-i-Alam, and other Afghan
leaders, so that I felt sure that neither they nor their followers
were to be depended upon. I was also somewhat anxious about the Pathan
soldiers in our ranks, a feeling which I was unwilling to acknowledge
even to myself, for they had hitherto behaved with marked loyalty,
and done splendid service; but they were now being exposed to a most
severe trial, in that they were, as I knew, being constantly appealed
to by their co-religionists to join in the _jahad_ against us, and
bitterly reproached for serving their infidel masters. Whether they
would be strong enough to resist such appeals, it was impossible to
tell; but it would have been most unwise, as well as most painful
to me, to show the slightest suspicion of these fine soldiers. It
happened that the Corps of Guides and 5th Punjab Infantry, which had
of all regiments the largest number of Mahomedans amongst them, were
located at the two extremities of the Bimaru range, the points most
likely to be attacked; to have made any change in the disposition
would have been to show that they were suspected, so I determined
(after taking their commanding officers, Colonels Jenkins and McQueen,
into my confidence) to leave them where they were, and merely to
strengthen each post by a couple of companies of Highlanders.

I was also considerably exercised about the safety of the large stacks
of firewood, grain, and forage, for if anything had happened to them
we could not have continued to hold Sherpur. There were not enough
British soldiers to furnish guards for these stacks, so I was obliged
to have them watched for a time by officers; an opportune fall of
snow, however, on the night of the 18th, rendered incendiarism
impossible.

One other extremely unpleasant precaution I felt it my duty to take
was the placin