e when they are treated in Latin, and in
such a manner as you treat them. And what, said I, do you think that I
must feel, who have already engaged to display philosophy to our nation?
Let us then, said he, continue the subject, since it is agreeable to you.

A threefold system of philosophising, then, was already received from
Plato. One, on the subject of life and morals. A second, on nature and
abstruse matters. The third, on discussion, and on what is true or false;
what is right or wrong in a discourse; what is consistent or inconsistent
in forming a decision.

And that first division of the subject, that namely of living well, they
sought in nature herself, and said that it was necessary to obey her; and
that that chief good to which everything was referred was not to be sought
in anything whatever except in nature. And they laid it down that the
crowning point of all desirable things, and the chief good, was to have
received from nature everything which is requisite for the mind, or the
body, or for life. But of the goods of the body, they placed some in the
whole, and others in the parts. Health, strength, and beauty in the whole.
In the parts, soundness of the senses, and a certain excellence of the
individual parts. As in the feet, swiftness; in the hands, strength; in
the voice, clearness; in the tongue, a distinct articulation of words. The
excellences of the mind they considered those which were suitable to the
comprehension of virtue by the disposition. And those they divided under
the separate heads of nature and morals. Quickness in learning and memory
they attributed to nature; each of which was described as a property of
the mind and genius. Under the head of "morals" they classed our studies,
and, I may say, our habits, which they formed, partly by a continuity of
practice, partly by reason. And in these two things was contained
philosophy itself, in which that which is begun and not brought to its
completion, is called a sort of advance towards virtue; but that which is
brought to completion is virtue, being a sort of perfection of nature and
of all things which they place in the mind; the one most excellent thing.
These things then are qualities of the mind.

The third division was that of life. And they said that those things which
had influence in facilitating the practice of virtue were connected with
this division. For virtue is discerned in some good qualities of the mind
and body, which are a